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The Golden Wedding Year: Erie Railroad Company v.
Tompkins and the Federal Rules
Mary Kay Kane*
Although this symposium is dedicated to the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in the world of
civil procedure enthusiasts, 1938 has additional significance. In that
same year the Supreme Court announced what one of its members later
called "one of the most important cases in American legal history."' The
case was Erie RailroadCo. v. Tompkins, 2 and it had and still has particularly
important implications for the Federal Rules. In Erie the Court announced that it was returning to the states the power to create common
law, since "[t]here is no federal general common law."'3 Because this
declaration occurred at the same time the Supreme Court exercised its
authority to promulgate the first set of federal civil rules, it underscored
that the federal judiciary nonetheless was competent to determine its
own matters of procedure. In this way, the two events were married:
federal rulemaking would be allowed to continue as long as it did not
step into the prohibited bounds of substance left to state control by Erie.
Consequently, 1988 is more than a birthday, it is the golden wedding year of these two events. As on all such anniversary occasions, it
seems appropriate to look back at how this union has prospered during
the last fifty years. Similar to most marriages of long duration, we can
find some serious points of controversy and tension; yet both the Erie
doctrine and the Federal Rules have endured. This raises two questions
that seem worth investigation. The first is how this marriage has survived
some of the inevitable problems it has faced. The second is what insights
the past fifty years can provide into resolving future tensions.
I. Historical Background
A brief recitation of how the pairing of the respective powers given
to the federal courts in the Rules of Decision Act 4 and in the Rules Enabling Act 5 came about is necessary to appreciate the current state of
affairs. The development of the notion that different constraints exist on
federal power when dealing with substantive, as contrasted with procedural, matters did not spring forth newborn in 1938. The First Judiciary
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. B.A., 1968, J.D.,
1971, University of Michigan. I gratefully acknowledge the helpful research assistance provided by
Stephen Thomas, a second year student at Hastings.
1 Black, Address, 13 Mo. B.J. 173, 174 (1942).
2 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
3 Id. at 78.
4 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 92 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(1982)).
5 Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, §§ 1-2, '48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2072

(1982)).
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Act 6 recognized this division by treating separately the question of governing law depending on whether the matters involved were procedural
or substantive. 7 Although this division has existed since the beginning of
the federal court system,8 the distinction between substantive and procedural matters was insignificant until the adoption of the Rules Enabling
Act in 1934. 9 Until that time, the federal courts were directed by Congress to apply the procedural law of the states in which they sat. 10 The
Enabling Act freed the federal courts from their state law bondage and
gave the Supreme Court rulemaking authority. Contained within that authorization was the constraint that the rules adopted should not
"abridge, modify or alter any substantive right."
In fact, when the Enabling Act was adopted, the substantive right
prohibition might not have been viewed as terribly restrictive since the
creation of federal common law was at its zenith and the Rules of Decision Act was narrowly construed under the then nearly century-old doctrine of Swift v. Tyson." But this division of power took on increasing
significance when the Supreme Court overruled Swift; Justice Brandeis
declared unconstitutional the interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act
that gave the federal courts common lawmaking authority except when a
state statute or constitution or a local matter was involved. 12 Although
arguments continue even to this day as to what constitutional constraints
actually exist,13 no one contests that the impact of Erie was to return to
the states a lawmaking power that the federal judiciary had usurped dur6 Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
7 Section 34 of the First Judiciary Act, also known as the Rules of Decision Act, provided that
the "laws of the several states.., shall be regarded as rules of decisions in trials at common law .. "
Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 92 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982)). For
cases in equity, the federal courts were told that they should follow the rules "heretofore followed."
The Supreme Court was given equity rulemaking authority in the Process Act of 1792. Act of May 8,
1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276. Separate provisions in the Judiciary Act dealt with governing law
questions for procedural matters in nonequity cases; these provisions required the courts to follow
the practice of the states in which they sat. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 94. Consequently, except for equity proceedings, the federal courts were directed to look to state law as a
source of both substantive and procedural authority. However, the fact that these directions were
contained in different provisions intimated that the conclusions reached on the source of governing
law in 1789 were not immutable.
8 For a more detailed description of the statutory history behind the development of federal
procedure, see 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 1002

(1987).
9

See supra note 5.

10 The original Process Act, supra note 7, was replaced by the Conformity Act of 1872. Act of
June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 197 (1872) (repealed 1934).
11 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). For a brief, but cogent discussion of the application of the Swift
doctrine, see C. WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 54 (4th ed. 1983).

12

304 U.S. at 71, 77-78.
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law
to be applied in any case is the law of the State.... There is no Federal general common
law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a
state whether they be local in nature or "general" .....

Id at 78.
13 See, e.g., infra note 17. See generally J.
§ 4.2, at 196-97 (1985).

FRIEDENTHAL,
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ing the Swift era. 14 It is ironic that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
first appeared in that same year, releasing the federal courts from the
constraints of state law on the matters contained in the Rules. The year
1938 thus began a new era in the balance of power between state and
federal courts-one that was to be controlled by the wavering (sometimes almost evanescent) line between substance and procedure.
Before examining how that balance has been maintained, two additional points bear mention. The first is simply an observation. It may be
that according to Justice Brandeis' view of the limitations on federal
court power there is no marriage of equal partners here. Although Erie
itself involved only an interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act, Justice
Brandeis was the sole member of the Court to dissent from the adoption
of the Federal Rules in 1938.15 The reasons are not clear,1 6 but one
speculation is that, to him, the constitutional restrictions were so strong
that judicial rulemaking would be suspect.17 Whatever its merits, that
view dearly did not prevail in the Court, as witnessed by the adoption of
the Federal Rules. Indeed, in his concurring opinion in Erie, Justice
Reed acknowledged the difference when he observed, "no one doubts
federal power over procedure." 1' 8
The second matter to note is the Supreme Court's 1965 decision in
Hanna v. Plumer,19 upholding the applicability of substituted service of
process under the Federal Rules in the face of conflicting state law.
14

For a thorough historical and social account of the Swift and Erie cases and the events sur-

rounding them, see T. FREYER, HARMoNY & DISSONANCE: THE SwIFr & ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN
FEDERALISM (1981).

15 302 U.S. 783 (1937).
16 Justice Brandeis advanced no reasons in his dissent from the rules. Id. After reviewing all the
evidence of the time regarding what might be Justice Brandeis' reasoning, Professor Burbank has
argued that Brandeis objected to the entire enterprise of federal rulemaking, not the specific set of
federal rules themselves, and that his concerns were practical rather than constitutional, stemming
from a belief that it was not necessary to displace state law. Letter of Stephen Burbank to Andreas
Lowenfeld (Mar. 6, 1985).
17 This view would not mean that the federal courts necessarily would have remained wedded to
state procedure. Legislation passed by Congress could fill the gap, which a delegation to the
Supreme Court of rulemaking authority could not. This conclusion rests on the notion that Justice
Brandeis saw two different constitutional restraints on the federal courts. The first was the tenth
amendment: neither Congress nor the federal judiciary were competent to invade the substantive
sphere left to the states. He stated this view in Erie. 304 U.S. at 78-79. See also T. FREYER, supra note
14, at 162. The second limit involved the separation of powers: federal courts cannot become
rulemakers, only Congress has the authority to do so under U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, coupled with
the Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. This argument does not appear openly in
Erie. But then the exact meaning of the constitutional portion ofJustice Brandeis' Erie opinion remains debatable. See C. WIGHT, supra note 11, § 56.
The separation of powers argument is advanced today to challenge the propriety of judicial
rulemaking. See, e.g., Burbank, Sanctions in the ProposedAmendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure:
Some QuestionsAbout Power, 11 HOFsTRA L. REv.997, 1007 (1983). See generally W. BROwN, FEDERAL
RULEMAING AND POSSIBILTrIES (Fed. Jud. Center 1981) (discussion of proposals to shift power to
promulgate Federal Rules to Congress). Indeed, considerable historical research has revealed that
Congress' primary concern in drafting the first Rules Enabling Act was the allocation of lawmaking
authority between the legislature and the judiciary, and that the preservation of states' rights was
secondary. See Burbank, The.Rules EnablingActof 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015, 1106 (1982); Subrin,
How Equity Conquered Common Law: The FederalRules of Civil Procedurein HistoricalPerspective, 135 U. PA.
L. REv. 909,985,996-98 (1987). Whatever the historic merits of these arguments, the tenth amendment restraints are the primary interest in this paper.
18 304 U.S. at 92 (Reed,J. concurring).
19 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
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Hanna is additional evidence that federal rulemaking proceeds on a parallel track with state common lawmaking power. Further, as long as the
Federal Civil Rules do not intrude into substantive spheres, they remain
constitutional, 20 and control over conflicting state law. This latter point
is important because it underscores the dominance of federal procedural
authority, as well as the importance of determining whether that author21
ity, or substantive rulemaking (which is left to the states), is involved.
Having stated that the division of federal and state competence was
established in 1938 and reenforced in the Supreme Court's later decision
in Hanna does not mean that clear bright lines of authority existed then
or now. Rather, it merely sets the parameters of the inquiry. The peaceful coexistence of federal rulemaking and state common law control depends on reaching some general agreement on what constitutes matters
of "substance" and what remains properly "procedural." An examination of how the Supreme Court and the lower courts have dealt with that
problem reveals both successes and failures in reaching a common understanding during the last fifty years.
Although most often the Federal Rules have been applied without
any questions arising as to whether they improperly abridge substantive
rights, the success of this division of authority depends on how it has
operated in the "gray" areas-the trouble zones of this marriage. 22 That
inquiry will begin with an examination of the specific guidance provided
by the Supreme Court on the meaning of the term "substantive rights,"
as it is used to limit the permissible scope of the Federal Rules. Then
this article will look carefully at how the Court's standard has been applied in the particularly difficult area of the applicability of those Federal
Rules that interact with state statutes of limitations. 2 3 A review of this
troublesome area will reveal whether the tenth amendment restrictions
acknowledged by Justice Brandeis have been effectively ignored. Additionally, this area offers insight into whether the Supreme Court has articulated sufficiently clear guidelines for the lower federal courts to
preserve the balance of power struck in 1938. Analysis of the interaction
between Federal Rules and state law in the area of statutes of limitations
thus may provide some basis for a prognosis regarding how similar gov20 ChiefJustice Warren, writing for the Court in Hanna, noted that Congress had the power
under the judiciary Clause, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, to provide for rules of procedure in the federal
courts, and that the Rules Enabling Act thus was constitutional. 380 U.S. at 471-74. This argument
was essentially the same as Justice Reed's concurring opinion in Erie. See supra note 18. Therefore,
according to ChiefJustice Warren, the proper question for a federal court confronted with differing
state and Federal Rules is to determine whether the Federal Rule is properly within the scope of the
Enabling Act; that is, whether it abridges a substantive right. If it is within the enabling legislation
and it conflicts with state law, the Federal Rule controls under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST.
art. VI. 380 U.S. at 464, 471-74.
21 The Hanna test also includes the notion that Federal Rules will control only if they conflict
with state law. If no conflict exists, and it is possible to apply both state and federal law, then federal
courts should do so. 380 U.S. at 469-470. This additional element has been of considerable importance and is the one on which many lower court decisions have turned. See infra Part III. See generally
19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS § 4510 (1982).
22 See, e.g., 19 C. WRIGTrr, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 21, §§ 4508-4510, at 4512.

23

FED. R. Civ. P. 3, 4(j), and 15(c). See infra Part III.
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erning law questions involving the proper scope of the Federal Rules are
likely to be answered in the future.
II. The Supreme Court Defines Substantive Rights
The definition of "substantive rights" or "substance" would have
several entries in any legal dictionary, even if it were limited to situations
involving governing law questions. 2 4 For purposes of this article, the inquiry into the proper line between substance and procedure is not, as
noted ChiefJustice Warren in Hanna, the same as a "relatively unguided
Erie choice." 25 Rather, the question analyzed here is how the term "substantive rights" is defined for purposes of the Rules Enabling Act, which
prohibits the promulgation of any
Federal Rule that "abridges, modifies
' 26
or enlarges a substantive right."
The narrow focus of the definition 2 7 has important implications.
Under the Hanna Court's approach, the presence of a Federal Rule gives
the federal judiciary added authority to ignore state law.
To hold that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure must cease to function
whenever it alters the mode of enforcing state-created rights would be
to disembowel either the Constitution's grant of power over federal
procedure
or Congress' attempt to exercise that power in the Enabling
28
Act.

As long as the Rule is valid under the Enabling Act, 29 and that Act is
constitutional (which Chief Justice Warren resolved affirmatively in
Hanna),3 0 the Rule controls over conflicting state law. 3 1 Some deference
to state interests was suggested in the Court's recognition that there
should be a careful inquiry into whether the federal and state laws actually clash. If they do not, then the federal courts may consider whether
state law should apply in light of the Rules of Decision Act policies ex32
pressed in Erie.
24 380 U.S. at 471. For example, governing law questions involving statutes of limitations have
been answered differently when the choice of law is between two states, rather than between federal
and state law. In the former situation, statutes of limitations traditionally have been treated as procedural. See Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Co., 220 F.2d 152, 154 (2d Cir. 1955). In the latter, the
Supreme Court has deemed them outcome determinative and substantive for Rules of Decision Act
purposes. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945). In diversity suits, both characterizations may be used. See, e.g., Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953).
25 380 U.S. at 471.
26 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982). Even with that limitation, arguments can be made about the appropriate definition. See 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 21, § 4509, at 144-45.
27 Compare the approach taken under the Rules of Decision Act. See infra note 32.
28 380 U.S. at 473-74.
29 If the rule is improper, it cannot be applied. Under those circumstances, the court would be
faced with asking whether the matters involved were to be controlled by state law under the Rules of
Decision Act and Erie.
30 380 U.S. at 472. See also supra note 20.
31 Id. at 473-74.
32 See id at 470.
The definition of substance for Rules of Decision Act purposes has evolved in a series of cases
since Erie. Two cases immediately following Erie merely invoked the procedure/substance distinction to rule in favor of state law. See Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 116-17 (1943); Cities Serv.
Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208, 212 (1939). In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), the
Court established the outcome determination test. Id at 109. In 1958, the Supreme Court revised
that standard to incorporate notions of comparing and balancing the competing federal and state
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The adoption of this standard, as well as the Hanna Court's
recharacterization of Erie as a general policy inquiry, 33 caused Justice
Harlan to write a concurring opinion in which he described the majority's
standard as the "arguably procedural ergo constitutional" test.3 4 Given
Hanna's minimal restraints on federal rulemaking, a question arises
whether the Enabling Act effectively eradicates the Rules of Decision Act
limits on federal power, at least when a Federal Rule is implicated. Justice Harlan suggested that it would be more appropriate to provide a
clear definition of substantive rights so that federal courts could deter35
mine when Erie controlled and demanded deference to state law.
Whether the application ofJustice Harlan's approach orJustice Warren's
more limited Rules Enabling Act inquiry would produce results more
consistent with the original design of this marriage of powers and restraints is not important here. The critical recognition is that the boundaries set in 1938 must be reevaluated in light of the ones established in
1965, for those now remain as our guideposts in determining whether an
appropriate balance has been achieved.
Hanna addresses the issue of when a rule improperly invades the
substantive sphere protected in the Enabling Act.3 6 The Hanna Court
37
endorsed the approach taken in two earlier Supreme Court decisions:
38
3
9
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. and MississippiPublishing Corp. v. Murphree. Reference to those cases underscores the narrowness of the limitation on
federal power to control substantive law under Enabling Act authority.
Sibbach upheld the validity of Federal Civil Rules 35 and 37, requiring the petitioner to submit to a physical examination for discovery purposes. Petitioner had conceded that the Rules were procedural in
character, but had argued that the application of the Rules invaded substantial rights-rights to privacy. 40 The Court specifically found that
Congress did not intend by its use of the term "substantive rights" in the
Enabling Act to include the vague notion of all "important and substantial rights theretofore recognized." '4 1 Rather, the term embraced "rights
conferred by law to be protected and enforced in accordance with the
policies. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537-38 (1958). That standard
was refined further and given a policy framework in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). Federal
courts determine whether they will stray impermissibly into the substantive preserve guaranteed the
states under the Rules of Decision Act by considering whether the application of federal law would
encourage forum-shopping or result in the inequitable administration of the laws. Id. at 467-68.
Only a substantial alteration in the enforcement of state-created rights is suspect. Id. at 468-69. For
a discussion of how these standards have been applied, see 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER,
supra note 21, § 4511.
33 See supra note 32.
34 380 U.S. at 476 (Harlan, J., concurring).
35 Justice Harlan would have required state law to be applied whenever the issue involved the
"primary decisions respecting human conduct which our constitutional system leaves to state regulation." Id. at 475.
36 See generally 19 C. WRIcrT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 21, § 4509.
37 380 U.S. at 464-65.
38 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
39 326 U.S. 438 (1946).
40 312 U.S. at 11, 14.
41 Id- at 13.
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adjective law of judicial procedure." 42 The Court concluded: "The test
must be whether a rule really regulates procedure,-the judicial process
for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for
justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of
43
them."
The Supreme Court in Mississippi Publishing further narrowed the
substantive rights limitation. It applied the Sibbach standard to uphold
the validity of Rule 4(f), which authorizes service of process anywhere
within the state in which the district court sits, not merely to the surrounding district. In an opinion by Chief Justice Stone, the Court acknowledged that the operation of Rule 4(f) "will undoubtedly affect" the
defendant's rights. 4 4 However, that impact could be disregarded. "Undoubtedly most alterations of the rules of practice and procedure may
and often do affect the rights of litigants. Congress' prohibition of any
alteration of substantive rights of litigants was obviously not addressed to
such incidental effects .... ,,4- Most important was the fact that Rule 4(f)
"does not operate to abridge, enlarge or modify
the rules of decision by
'4 6
which that court will adjudicate its rights."
By reference to these two precedents in Hanna, ChiefJustice Warren
made clear that the Rules Enabling Act's substantive rights restriction
only would proscribe rulemaking that would significantly affect the decisional rules underlying the adjudication of the right to relief. Not surprisingly, Rule 4(d)(1), authorizing substituted service of process, was
47
found to be within the proper scope of the Act by the Hanna Court.
The Sibbach inquiry into whether "a rule really regulates procedure"
thus offers no real standard by which lower courts can examine the validity of the Federal Rules. 48 Nonetheless, it is not necessary to conclude
that the Hanna Court skewed the balance of state and federal power envisioned by Justice Brandeis in 1938. Rather, the Court's interpretation of
the Enabling Act simply recognized that Congress had the power "to
regulate matters which, though falling within the uncertain area between
42
43

Id.
Id. at 14.
The Supreme Court took a similar approach in upholding the validity of Federal Rule 54(b),
governing certification ofjudgments in multiple claims actions for immediate appeal. See Cold Metal
Process Co. v. United Eng'g & Foundry Co., 351 U.S. 445 (1956). It said:
The amended rule meets the needs and problems of modern judicial administration by
adjusting the unit for appeal to fit multiple claims actions, while retaining a right ofjudicial

review over the discretion exercised by the District Court in determining when there is no
just reason for delay. This does not impair the statutory concept of finality embraced in
§ 1291, and ... is within the rulemaking power of this Court.

Id. at 453.
44 326 U.S. at 446.
45 Id. at 445.
46 Id. at 446.
47 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464.
48 See 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 21, § 4509, at 141-42. Not surprisingly,
this narrow interpretation of the Enabling Act's restrictions has been criticized. See, e.g., Ely, The
IrrepressibleMyth of Erie, 87 HARv.L. REV. 693, 718-20 (1974); Westen & Lehman, Is There Lifefor Erie
After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REv. 311, 360-64 (1980).
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substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as
either,"'4 9 and that Congress did so in the 1934 legislation.
A strong presumption exists (indeed, one that to date never has
been rebutted) that any rule that has gone through the enabling process
is procedural. 50 Thus, perhaps it is not surprising that lower courts engaging in a Hanna analysis often appear merely to be paying lip-service
to this portion of the inquiry, 5 1 if they even include it. This does not
mean, however, that all restraints have disappeared or that the Federal
Rules and rulemaking power have attained a position of complete dominance. What has happened is that the "battlefield" positions have
changed.
In Hanna, ChiefJustice Warren made an important suggestion concerning federal restraints when he discussed other Supreme Court cases
52
in which, although a Federal Rule was implicated, state law was applied.
He explained and approved those results, noting that in those cases the
scope of the Federal Rule was found insufficiently broad to cover the
point in issue. Consequently, no clear conflict existed between state and
federal law, and the federalism boundaries present in Erie compelled the
application of state law.
This addition to the governing law inquiry arguably preserves the
proper balance of power between state and federal interests and sustains
our marriage of equal partners. Undue emphasis on or enlargement of
federal power is avoided not only by application of the admittedly weak
Enabling Act restraints, but also by careful scrutiny of the question
whether the federal and state rules actually conflict. This scrutiny requires a serious investigation into the proper scope of the Federal Rule,
both in terms of the rulemakers' intentions as well as in light of substan53
tive restraints.
The question remains whether this refinement on the governing law
standard has served as an effective curb on the dominance of the Federal
Rules. An affirmative answer depends on the lower courts' understanding of two things: (1) how to accomplish a proper Hanna analysis; and (2)
the fact that the Hanna Court's ruling in favor of federal law did not dilute Erie's mandate of deference to state law unless strong federal interests are implicated. A good testing ground for that inquiry is the case law
dealing with Federal Rules that allegedly implicate a state statute of
limitations.
49
50

380 U.S. at 472.
As described by Justice Harlan in his concurrence in Hanna,
[s]o long as a reasonable man could characterize any duly adopted federal rule as "procedural," the Court ... would have it apply no matter how seriously it frustrated a State's
substantive regulation of the primary conduct and affairs of its citizens. Since the members
of the Advisory Committee, the Judicial Conference, and this Court who formulated the
Federal Rules are presumably reasonable men, it follows that the integrity of the Federal
Rules is absolute.
L at 476.
51 See, e.g., cases cited infra note 104. The notion that the Supreme Court can act objectively in
evaluating the validity of rules earlier promulgated by it also has been challenged. SeeJ. WEINSTEIN,
REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 96-98 (1977).
52 380 U.S. at 470.
53 See generally 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 21, § 4510, at 170-71.
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III.

The Federal Rules and State Statutes of Limitations

There are three Federal Rules that facially appear to affect otherwise
relevant state statutes of limitations: Federal Rule 3, providing that civil
actions are commenced by filing; Federal Rule 4(j), setting forth a 120day time limit for service of process; and Federal Rule 15(c), authorizing
the relation back of amendments after the limitations period has expired.
Before examining the experience under these provisions, two observations merit review.
First, a review of lower court decisions confronting Erie problems
involving the applicability of these three Rules reveals that the lower
courts often have misunderstood the standard enunciated in Hanna, resulting in conflicting decisions. Although this observation probably is
not shocking to students of civil procedure or federal courts, it certainly
is troublesome to those who prize coherence in the law or who, perhaps
naively, look to the Supreme Court to establish workable guidelines for
lower court application.
The second observation may be more surprising, however. Experience has shown that the lower courts have not used (or abused) their
authority to ignore state law conflicting with a Federal Rule. In fact,
some cases even indicate that an understanding of how to achieve a
proper Erie analysis when state limitations are involved may be emerging
in the 1980s. The implications of these observations on future rulemaking and rule interpretation questions will be explored later. What follows now is a discussion of the evidence supporting them.
A.

Federal Rule 3

Questions regarding the applicability of Federal Rule 3, which
deems an action commenced by filing, in the face of a state law linking
commencement to service, no longer pose problems in the lower courts
because the Supreme Court has provided a firm response. The issue first
arose in a pre-Hanna case, Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co..54
The Court held that the federal court was bound to follow the state rule
because that rule was an integral part of the state's statute of limitations. 55 As declared by the Supreme Court, the limitations period cannot
be given a "longer life in the federal court than it would have had in the
state court without adding something to the cause of action. We may not
do that consistently with Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. ' 56
The same issue returned to the Court in the 1980 case of Walker v.
Armco Steel Corp. ,5 and the Court reaffirmed Ragan's conclusion that state
law controls. Justice Marshall explained that the situation at hand did
58
not involve a direct conflict between the Federal Rule and state law.
Unlike the state provision, Rule 3 on its face and in light of the Advisory
54 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
55 Id. at 534. The suit was found to be untimely because, although it was commenced prior to
the running of the statute of limitations, service was not accomplished until after. Id. at 533.
56 Id. at 533-34.
57 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
58 Id. at 749-50.
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Committee's comments is not designed to act as a tolling rule for state
limitations provisions. 59 Instead, "Rule 3 governs the date from which
various timing requirements of the Federal Rules begin to run, but does
not affect state statutes of limitations. ' 60 Given
this construction of the
61
Rule, Erie commands deference to state law.
The results in these cases support the second observation suggested
earlier, that is, that the federal authority to promulgate a separate set of
procedural rules has not been interpreted as authorizing intrusion into
spheres traditionally deemed within state control. 62 Further, the fact that
this issue had to go to the Supreme Court a second time after Hanna
illustrates the difficulties that lower courts have had in understanding
how to make a proper governing law inquiry.
Some of the lower court confusion can be attributed to Justice
Harlan's concurring opinion in Hanna.63 In particular, he suggested that
the majority had misconceived the constitutional premises of Erie, which
would require in some circumstances that a state rule prevail even if it
conflicted with a Federal Rule. Instead, the Court had found a "grant of
substantive legislative power in the constitutional provision for a federal
court system .

.

. setting up the Federal Rules as a body of law invio-

late."
Nowhere did Justice Harlan address the majority's suggested
limitation: that the Federal Rules should control only if an inquiry into
the proper scope of the rule revealed that federal and state law were directly in conflict. 65 Indeed, the majority had cited the Ragan opinion at
that point in its decision. 6 6 Instead, when Justice Harlan discussed
Ragan, he argued that it was decided wrongly and that "the interest of
the federal system in proceeding under its own rules should have prevailed." 67 Justice Harlan's interpretation of the majority decision conflicted with the majority's seemingly approving reference to the Ragan
result and its suggestion of how that result could be accomplished by
carefully delineating the scope of the Rules. This conflict led some lower
courts to interpret Hanna as authorizing federal rule control, even as
others continued to uphold Ragan.68 In any event, Walker firmly resolved
the governing law debate with respect to Rule 3,69 and, more impor59 Id. at 750-51.
60 Id. at 751. By contrast, and even more recently, the Court construed Rule 3 as providing a
tolling rule in federal question cases. West v. Conrail, 107 S. Ct. 1538 (1987).
61 446 U.S. at 750.
62 The conclusion that statutes of limitations are appropriately within state control, in the absence of specific federal legislation, is supported by the Supreme Court's decision in Guaranty Trust
Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945). This fact was acknowledged in both Ragan, 337 U.S. at 532,
and Walker, 446 U.S. at 745.
63 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965).
64 Id. at 475-76 (Harlan, J., concurring).
65 Id. at 470.
66 Id. at 470 n.12.
67 Id. at 477.
68 A thorough examination of the lower court experience involving Rule 3 and state statutes of
limitations may be found in 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 8, § 1057.
69 This does not mean that all Rule 3 governing law questions have been resolved. Lower courts
sometimes differ in construing state provisions to determine whether the state commencement rule
is bound up with the statute of limitations. If it is not, then deference need not be given to state law.
See the decisions cited in 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 8, § 1057 nn.8-10.
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tantly, should have clarified the standard to be applied to analogous
questions under Rules 40) and 15(c).
B.

FederalRule 4(j)

The experience under Rule 40) is relatively sparse, yet revealing,
since that provision was added to the Federal Rules in 1983, after Walker.
Specifically, the Rule provides that service must be accomplished within
120 days after the complaint is filed. Failure to meet this requirement
results in dismissal "without prejudice" if no good cause is shown as to
why service was not accomplished within that period. The potential interaction between Rule 4(j)
and statutes of limitations is clear,70 as is the
7'
Erie or Walker dilemma.
In a case in which the Rule 4(j) period is shorter than the relevant
limitations period, for example, the application of the Federal Rule
would not shorten impermissibly the life of the cause of action since Rule
4(j) provides for dismissal without prejudice. 72 The party may refile if
the state permits recommencement after a dismissal not on the merits. 73
Like Rule 3, the application of the Federal Rule serves a legitimate objective in the federal court system. It encourages more efficient litigation by
reducing the delay between the institution of suit and service 74 and does
75
not adversely impact on the statute of limitations.
A more difficult question is posed if the state statute of limitations
runs before the end of the 120-day grace period. For example, if suit is
filed one week before the limitations period expires and state law, which
ties commencement to service, allows only a sixty-day grace period for
service, can Rule 40) be invoked to allow the suit to continue when service is made on day 100? Would an affirmative response to that question
impermissibly enlarge the state limitations period?
There are two possible responses to those questions. The first is to
read Walker as requiring that state law control and that the 120-day period operates only so long as the state requirements recognize a live
70 See 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 8, § 1056, at 187-94; Siegel, Practice Commentary on
Amendment of FederalRule 4 (Ef.Feb. 26, 1983) with Special Statute of Limitations Precautions, 96 F.R.D.
88, 101-09 (1983).
71 See Mullenix, The New FederalFxpress: Mail Service of Process UnderAmended Rule 4, 4 REV. LrrIGATION 299, 331-34 (1985).

72 The same conclusion would apply if the 120-day period elapses after the statute of limitations
has run and service still is not accomplished. The federal court's dismissal and refusal to find good
cause would terminate the lawsuit. Though technically the dismissal is without prejudice, the party
would have no opportunity to refile. However, in that case, the action cannot go forward because
the state limitations period prevents its refiling, not because the Federal Rule shortened the life of
the cause of action.
73 See, e.g., Yarber v. Allstate Ins. Co., 674 F.2d 232, 233 (4th Cir. 1982); Shuford v. K.K.
Kawamura Cycle Co., 649 F.2d 261, 262 (4th Cir. 1981). If the state does not recognize a grace
period for refiling, then the operation of Rule 4(j) effectively terminates the action. See generally 4 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 8, § 1056, at 193-94. However, in that event, the action still is cut
off because of state law, which treats the Rule 4(j) dismissal as final.
74

See generally 4A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 8, § 1137, at 385.

75 But see Bryant v. Ford Motor Co., 832 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (dissenting opinion)
(Rule 4(j) cannot be reconciled with California rule allowing three years for service on John Doe
defendants and Federal Rule must govern).
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claim to exist. 76 However, unlike Rule 3, a narrow construction of the
Rule as unrelated to limitations periods arguably is not necessary or reasonable in order to avoid a conflict with state law. 77 The Walker Court
noted that "[t]he Federal Rules should be given their plain meaning. If a
direct collision with state law arises from that plain meaning, then the
78
analysis developed in Hanna v. Plumer applies."
If Rule 4(j) is construed to act as a tolling provision, the Federal
Rule could control. The question whether Rule 40) so construed would
violate the Rules Enabling Act limitations need never be seriously considered because of the unusual circumstances surrounding the 1983 rule
amendments. Those amendments were not the product of the ordinary
rulemaking process; rather, they were the first to be enacted by Congress. 79 As congressional legislation, therefore, the provision is not limited by the Enabling Act's substantive rights prohibition 8 and a
construction demanding its application would not be inconsistent with
8
the original concerns of Justice Brandeis about federal judicial power. '
This conclusion is only mildly comforting, however, since a similar provision appeared in the proposed 1982 rule amendments8 2 and there is no
indication that Congress took control of the amendment process because
83
of Rules Enabling Act concerns.
Against this background and analysis, it is interesting to look at the
experience of the lower courts. In particular, two reported cases deal in
some detail with the potential governing law questions surrounding Rule
4(j).84
76 The wisdom of this interpretation for practitioners cannot be seriously questioned. See, e.g.,
Siegel, supra note 70, at 106 ("[W]hen the statute of limitations is at stake, it is better to bow than to
differ. Bowing, in this context, means taking such steps as will satisfy all possible criteria, rather than
indulging oneself with too rosy an assumption.").
77 Such a narrow construction would entail viewing the rule as only "a time requirement for
service triggered by the filing of a complaint under Rule 3." 4A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note
8, § 1137, at 396. Although this narrow construction is feasible and limits the scope of the rule to
matters clearly within the rulemaking power, one may question whether it is meaningful or realistic.
Even Professors Wright and Miller do not seem convinced. See 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MIL.ER, supra note
8, § 1057, at 206 ("Although Rule 3 is inapplicable for limitations purposes in diversity actions, Rule
4, as amended in 1983, is both applicable and relevant to the tolling of the statute of limitations.").
78 Walker, 446 U.S. 740, 750 n.9 (1980).
79 See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-462, 96 Stat.
2527 (1983).
80 See Sentry Corp. v. Harris, 802 F.2d 229, 233 n.7 (7th Cir. 1986); Walker, The 1983Amendments
to FederalRule of Civil Procedure4- Process,Jurisdiction, and Erie PrinciplesRevisited, 19 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 957, 977 (1983).
81 See supra note 17.
82 Proposed 1982 amendments to Rule 4, reprinted in 93 F.R.D. 255, 258 (1982). The Advisory
Committee Notes attached to proposed subdivision (j) make no mention of statute of limitations
questions. Id. at 263. The absence of attention to the issue has been questioned elsewhere. See
Siegel, supra note 70, at 977.
83 For a discussion of the changes and concerns reflected in Congressional action, see 4A C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 8, § 1137, at 386-90. The House Report accompanying the bill to
delay the effect of the Supreme Court's 1982 proposals refers to concerns about ambiguities as to
how Rule 4(j) would interact with the limitations statutes, but appears to focus on the meaning of the
terms "dismissal without prejudice," rather than on the validity of the rule insofar as it might allow
the continuation of an action after the statute had run. H. REP. No. 662, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5,
reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 595, 597-98.
84 Two additional cases exist, but are not holdings. See Sentry Corp. v. Harris, 802 F.2d 229,233
n.7 (7th Cir. 1986) (federal question case in which state limitations borrowed. Court never reached
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The Second Circuit in Morse v. Elmira Country Club, 8 5 confronted the
problem whether the New York statute of limitations, which relies on service for commencement, would bar a federal diversity suit in which plaintiff mailed service to defendant before the state statute ran, but
defendant's refusal to return the required acknowledgement resulted in
personal delivery after the limitations period had expired, but within the
120 days allowed by Rule 4j). The district court had dismissed the action, relying on Walker 8 6 but the .Second Circuit reversed. The court's
decision, however, does not suggest Federal Rule dominance. Rather, it
rests on the conclusion that state law controls the tolling of the statute,
whereas federal law controls the proper method of service.8 7 Under this
interpretation, federal law determined how to treat the effectiveness of
mail service under the circumstances in the case and the court found it to
be accomplished before the statute ran. The appellate court rejected the
argument that the suit also was timely because personal service was
achieved within the Rule 4(j) period. The court held that the argument
that Rule 4(j) effectively adds 120 days to the state statutory period "is a
dubious proposition at best in light of Walker...
."88 The court also
noted that the legislative history supporting the Rule suggests that Congress was cognizant of the distinction between tolling rules and service
rules and did not intend to enact any rule that would affect the statutory
89
period.
The second case involving Rule 4() presented a slightly different
situation. In Poulos v. Wilson, 9 0 plaintiff filed suit and actually served process eight days before the Vermont statute of limitations expired. However, under state law, plaintiff had an additional time constraint service had to be accomplished within thirty days after filing (in contrast
to Rule 4(j)'s 120-day period) to constitute proper commencement. In
the case at hand, thirty-one days had elapsed. 9 1 The district court reviewed the entire Erie line of cases and found that the Vermont rule was
similar to that in Walker and was an integral part of the state statute of
limitations. 9 2 Further, it noted that since the Walker Court had concluded that Rule 3 was not intended to displace state tolling rules and the
Supreme Court had in another decision commented that Rule 4 deals
only with process, 93 it was unwilling to conclude that Rule 40) should
plaintiff's Rule 46) argument, but commented in a footnote that the rule does not operate as a
tolling provision in diversity cases); Bryant v. Ford Motor Co., 832 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1987) (en
banc) (dissenting opinion) (Rule 4(j), which was more restrictive than state law, viewed as
controlling).
85 752 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1984).
86 102 F.R.D. 199, 200 (W.D.N.Y. 1984).
87 Morse, 752 F.2d at 38.
88

Id. at 42.

89 Id.
90 116 F.R.D. 326 (D. Vt. 1987).
91 Id. at 328.
92 Id. at 329.
93 Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 30 (1986).
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displace any "state rules that describe the steps needed to commence an
action so as to toll the state limitations period." 94
The Supreme Court implicitly confirmed the correctness of these
analyses in its 1987 decision in West v. Conrail.9 5 Although that case involved a federal question, the Court in a footnote stated that in diversity
suits "state law not only provides the appropriate period of limitations
but also 6 determines whether service must be effected within that
9
period."
The ease with which the lower courts have concluded that the
proper scope of Rule 4(j) is limited to a process provision, not a tolling
rule, is notable, particularly in light of the ambiguities appearing to support Federal Rule dominance. Perhaps the restrained approach taken by
the courts is not surprising since it was suggested in the legislative history surrounding the 1983 amendments to Rule 4.97 Nonetheless, the
fact that lower courts readily have adopted this interpretation demonstrates that, despite the opportunity for the expansion of federal court
power in this setting, the federal courts have followed Erie, ruling with
great deference to state law. It also suggests that Walker may have resolved the confusion about the proper analysis to be used when evaluating governing law questions involving the Federal Rules.
C.

Federal Rule 15(c)

Rule 15(c) provides yet another challenge to the lower courts' understanding of the balance between state power over substance and federal power over procedure. This section analyzes the experience under
Rule 15(c), both after Hanna and then after Walker, to see whether governing law issues have been resolved readily or any differently there.
Before discussing the lower courts' treatment of these issues, however, it
is important to understand the special questions raised under Federal
Rule 15(c), as they differ somewhat from those arising under Federal
Rules 3 and 4(j).
Rule 15(c) provides authority for the federal courts to allow the
amendment of pleadings adding claims for relief or changing the parties
against whom a claim is made after the relevant statute of limitations has
run. Specifically, Rule 15(c) allows those amendments to relate back to
the filing of the action whenever the amendments meet the standards set
out in the Rule.98 The requirements relating to amendments which
94 116 F.R.D. at 330. The court also relied on Morse v. Elmira Country Club, 752 F.2d 35 (2d
Cir. 1984) to support its conclusion.
95 107 S. Ct. 1538 (1987).
96 Id. at 1541 n.4.
97 See the Report of the Department ofJustice to the House Judiciary Committee on the proposed legislative amendments of Rule 4. That report is reprinted in the Congressional Record of
the House hearings and may be found at 96 F.R.D. 81, 120 n.14 (1983).
98 Relation back of amendments involving additional claims or defenses requires that they arise
out of the "conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original
pleading." If a party is to be changed, the court must find additionally that "within the period
provided by law for commencing the action against the party to be brought in by amendment that
party (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced
in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake
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change parties were given a narrow construction by the Supreme Court
in its 1986 decision in Schiavone v. Fortune.9 9 The Court held that the
language in the Rule requiring that the notice to the newly named defendant must have been provided "within the period provided by law for
commencing the action against the party," referred to the applicable statute of limitations and did not include the time period that might be allowed for service of process under Rule 4(j). Although this construction
can be criticized, 10 0 it avoids any suggestion that the Federal Rule impermissibly enlarges the limitations period. Perhaps because of this, the
Court avoided the opportunity in Schiavone to address the Erie
question.' l 0
Stated generally, the primary governing law issue that arises is
whether the Rule 15(c) standard should control when state law includes
different standards for the relation back of amendments adding claims or
parties. Where the federal relation back criteria are more liberal than the
state's, the application of Rule 15(c) arguably serves to enlarge the period for bringing a timely claim in violation of the state limitations period. Conversely, if the federal criteria are more restrictive than the
state, their application and the resultant denial of the amendment arguably shortens the state statutory period. Viewed this way, a decision to
allow Federal Rule dominance appears inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's sensitivity in Ragan and later in Walker to avoiding rule constructions that impermissibly affect the state statutory period. Consequently,
as was true in the cases involving Rules 3 and 4(j), the question becomes
whether it is possible to construe Rule 15(c) in such a way that it would
not conflict with, but would allow deference to, state law.. If not, then it is
necessary to consider whether the Rule is valid under the Enabling Act
102
standard.
A review of the treatment of Rule 15(c) by the lower federal courts
reveals their difficulties in understanding the Supreme Court's standard
for analysis, as well as the potential for conflicting results. Prior to 1980
and the Walker clarification of Hanna and Ragan, a majority of the courts
reached their conclusions on the governing law issue with no discussion,10 3 often never even citing the relevant Supreme Court docconcerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party."
FED. R. Cirv. P. 15(c).
99 477 U.S. 21, 30 (1986).
100 See Schiavone, 477 U.S. at 32-40 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Bauer, Schiavone: An Un-Fortune-ate
Illustrationof the Supreme Court'sRole as Interpreterof the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,63 NoTRE DAME L.
REv. 720 (1988).
101 See Lewis,Jr., The Ecessive Hisry of FederalRule 15(c) and Its Lessonsfor Civil Rules Revision, 85
MiCH. L. REV. 1507, 1545 (1987).
102 See infra text accompanying notes 125-27.
103 The following cases held that Rule 15(c) was more liberal than the state law and that Rule
15(c) controlled. These courts gave little or no attention to the basis for this conclusion, nor did
they cite Hanna or Ragan. See, e.g., Ingram v. Kumar, 585 F.2d 566, 570 n.5 (2d Cir. 1978); Gifford v.
Wichita Falls & S. Ry. Co., 224 F.2d 374, 376 (5th Cir. 1955); Grandey v. Pacific Indem. Co., 217
F.2d 27, 29 (5th Cir. 1954); Petsel v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 202 F.2d 817, 863 (8th Cir. 1953);
American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. All Am. Bus Lines, 190 F.2d 234, 237 (10th Cir. 1951); Patraka
v. Armco Steel Co., 495 F. Supp. 1013, 1016 (M.D. Pa. 1980); Pittman v. Anaconda Wire & Cable
Co., 408 F. Supp. 286, 290-91 (E.D.N.C. 1976); Garr v. Clayville, 71 F.R.D. 553, 555 (D. Del. 1976);
Thomas v. Medesco, Inc., 67 F.R.D. 129,131 (E.D. Pa. 1974); United States for Use of E & R Constr.
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trine. 10 4 Others avoided the issue by ruling that the federal and0 5state
rules essentially were similar or would produce the same results.
The courts that actually tackled the governing law question, like the
earlier courts dealing with the applicability of Rule 3, were divided in
their conclusions. A majority held that the Federal Rule should control.' 0 6 Some based that conclusion on a finding that a direct conflict
between the federal and state relation back rules existed so that, relying
on Hanna, federal law should govern. 10 7 At least one court distinguished
Ragan on the ground that, unlike Rule 3, Rule 15(c) could not be construed to avoid a conflict. 10 8 Yet others held that Hanna overruled
Ragan 10 9 (a conclusion now known to be erroneous). Those courts holdCo. v. Guy H. James Constr. Co., 390 F. Supp. 1193, 1201-02 (M.D. Tenn. 1972); Swartzwelder v.
Hamilton, 56 F.R.D. 606, 608 (M.D. Pa. 1972); Carroll v. Sterling Hotel Co., 16 F.R.D. 99, 100 (M.D.
Pa. 1964); Russell v. Pay Way Feed Mills, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 314, 317 (D. Kan. 1963); Borup v.
National Airlines, 117 F. Supp. 475, 476-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). But see Straub v.Jaeger, 9 F.R.D. 672,
675 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
In some cases the court never stated whether the federal rule was more liberal, more restrictive
or identical to the state relation back rule, but merely ruled that Rule 15(c) prevails, without citing
either Hanna or Ragan. See, e.g., Anderson v. Phoenix of Hartford Ins. Co., 320 F. Supp. 399, 405
(W.D. La. 1970); C. Corkin & Sons, Inc. v. Tide Water Assoc. Oil Co., 20 F.R.D. 402, 404 (D. Mass.
1957); Robert W. Irwin Co. v. Sterling, 14 F.R.D. 250, 257 (W.D. Mich. 1953). The same lack of
analysis appears in some cases holding that state law applies. See, e.g., McNamara v. Kerr-McGee
Chem. Corp., 328 F. Supp. 1058, 1059 (E.D.N.C. 1971); Brennan v. Rooney, 139 F. Supp. 484, 489
(E.D. Pa. 1956); DeFay v. East & West Ins. Co., 101 F. Supp. 922, 925 (N.D. Ill. 1951).
104 A few cases decided the governing law question without discussion, but cited Hanna for authority, ruling that the Rule 15(c) governs. See, e.g., Royal Indem. Co. v. Petrozzsino, 598 F.2d 816,
820 (3d Cir. 1979); Holdridge v. Heyer-Schulte Corp., 440 F. Supp. 1088, 1093 n.2 (N.D.N.Y. 1977);
Tabacaera Cubana v. Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 772, 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Others
ruled in favor of state law without discussion, but relying on Ragan. See, e.g., Nave v. Ryan, 266 F.
Supp. 405, 407 (D. Conn. 1967); Nayer v. Robertshaw-Fulton Controls Co., 195 F. Supp. 704, 70607 (D. Mass. 1961); Tarbert v. Ingraham, 190 F. Supp. 402, 404-05 (D. Conn. 1960). But compare
Fricks v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 46 F.R.D. 31, 33 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (ruling that Rule 15(c)
controls by distinguishing Ragan).
105 See, e.g., Skidmore v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 529 F.2d 1244, 1249 (5th Cir. 1976); Travelers
Ins. Co. v. Brown, 338 F.2d 229, 234 (5th Cir. 1964); Russell v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 303
F.2d 674, 680-81 (8th Cir. 1962); Taormina Corp. v. Escobedo, 254 F.2d 171, 174 (5th Cir. 1958);
Bums v. Turner Constr. Co., 265 F. Supp. 768, 769 (D. Mass. 1967); Cone v. Shunka, 40 F.R.D. 12,
14 (W.D. Wis. 1966); Win. T. Burton, Inc. v. Reed Roller Bit Co., 214 F. Supp. 84, 86 (W.D. La.
1963); Frankel v. Styer, 209 F. Supp. 509, 510 (E.D. Pa. 1962); Melzer v. Hotel Corp. of Am., 25
F.R.D. 62, 67 n.7 (N.D. Ohio 1959); Smith v. Potomac Edison Co., 165 F. Supp. 681, 685 (D. Md.
1958); Ross v. Philip Morris Co., 164 F. Supp. 683, 688-89 (W.D. Mo. 1958); Wholesale Supply Co.
v. South Chester Tube Co., 20 F.R.D. 310, 314-15 (E.D. Pa. 1957); Ackerley v. Commercial Credit
Co., 111 F. Supp. 92, 96-97 (D.N.J. 1953);Janis v. Kansas Elec. Power Co., 99 F. Supp. 88, 91 (D.
Kan. 1951).
106 See, e.g., Davis v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 615 F.2d 606, 611-12 (4th Cir. 1980); Welch v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 466 F.2d 1344, 1345-46 (5th Cir. 1972); Loudenslager v. Teeple, 466 F.2d
249, 250 (3d Cir. 1972); Crowder v. Gordons Transp., Inc., 387 F.2d 413, 417-19 (8th Cir. 1967);
Goodman v. Poland, 395 F. Supp. 660, 682-83 (D. Md. 1975); Applied Data Processing, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 58 F.R.D. 149, 151-52 (D. Conn. 1973); Anderson v. Phoenix of Hartford Ins. Co.,
320 F. Supp. 399, 405 (W.D. La. 1970); Holmes v. Pennsylvania N.Y. Cent. Transp. Co., 48 F.R.D.
449, 451-52 (N.D. Ind. 1969); Scalise v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 47 F.R.D. 148, 150-51 (D. Del. 1969);
Newman v. Freeman, 262 F. Supp. 106, 110-13 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Meredith v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
41 F.R.D. 34, 39 (S.D. Cal. 1966); Martz v. Miller Bros. Co., 244 F. Supp. 246, 249-50 (D. Del. 1965).
But see Magno v. Canadian Pac., Ltd., 84 F.R.D. 414, 415-16 (D. Mass. 1979).
107 See, e.g., Davis, 615 F.2d at 611-12; Crowder, 387 F.2d at 417-19; Goodman, 395 F. Supp. at 68283; Meredith, 41 F.R.D. at 39.
108 See Davis, 615 F.2d at 611-12.
109 See, e.g., Applied Data Processing,Inc., 58 F.R.D. at 152; Scalise, 47 F.R.D. at 150-51; Newman, 262
F. Supp. at 111.
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ing that the Federal Rule controlled assumed without explanation that
their construction of Rule 15(c) comported with the Rules Enabling Act
restrictions. 110
On the opposite side of the spectrum, fewer courts held in favor of
applying the relevant state law to determine whether a particular amendment should relate back. Not surprisingly, prior to Hanna, those courts
so ruling uniformly found Ragan to compel that result."1 Confronted
with the Hanna Court's deference to the Federal Rules, a few courts
nonetheless still ruled in favor of state law. 1 12 In one case the court
reached that conclusion because it found that it was clear that Rule 15(c)
did not apply to the computation of the limitations period. 113 The First
Circuit, which found the more restrictive Federal Rule to be in conflict
with the relevant state law, held in favor of state law. The court reasoned
that a Federal Rule cannot be applied if it defeats state substantive law
and that Hanna requires the application of a conflicting Federal
Rule only
14
when two strictly procedural rules are in direct conflict."
The point here is not to suggest that the results in these cases were
improper. Rather, it is simply to emphasize the lack of consensus (and
perhaps understanding) in the lower courts of how to make a proper
Hanna analysis.
The results and analysis found in the reported opinions since Walker
remain, at least on the surface, divided. Sixteen reported opinions
presenting Rule 15(c) governing law questions have appeared since
1980.115 Eleven ruled in favor of Federal Rule control; 1 16 five ruled in
favor of state law. 1 17 Of the eleven decisions favoring Federal Rule
110 See, e.g., Davis, 615 F.2d at 611-12; Crowder, 387 F.2d at 417-19; Goodman, 395 F. Supp. at 68283; Holmes, 48 F.R.D. at 452; Scalise, 47 F.R.D. at 150-51; cf., e.g., Welch, 466 F.2d at 1345-46; Meredith, 41 F.R.D. at 39-40 (no mention of any Rules Enabling Act implications).
III See, e.g., Cummings v. Greif Bros. Cooperage Co., 202 F.2d 824, 827 (8th Cir. 1953); Talley v.
Piersen, 33 F.R.D. 2, 4 (E.D. Pa. 1963); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Continental Bldg. Operating Co., 137 F. Supp. 493, 494-95 (W.D. Mo. 1956); Nola Elec. Co. v. Reilly, 93 F. Supp. 164, 172
(S.D.N.Y. 1949), cert. denied sub nom. Reilly v.Goddard, 340 U.S. 951 (1951).
112 E.g., Marshall v. Mulrenin, 508 F.2d 39, 44-45 (1st Cir. 1974); Burns v. Turner Constr. Co.,
265 F. Supp. 768, 769-70 (D. Mass. 1967), aft'don othergrounds, 402 F.2d 332 (1st Cir. 1968); West v.
Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 697, 701 (E.D. Mo. 1966).
113 West, 264 F.Supp. at 701.
114 Marshall, 508 F.2d at 44.
115 Eighteen decisions actually have been found. But in two of them the courts found the state
and federal rules on relation back to be identical so that they did not need to make a choice regarding the governing law. See Farris v. Moeckel, 664 F. Supp. 881, 895 & n.4 (D. Del. 1987); Odence v.
Salmonson Ventures, 108 F.R.D. 163, 167 n.3 (D.R.I. 1985).
116 See Johansen v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 810 F.2d 1377, 1380 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 148 (1987); Santana v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 686 F.2d 736, 740 (9th Cir. 1982); Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. New York Times Co., 665 F. Supp. 248,255 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aft'd, 842 F.2d 612
(2d Cir. 1988); Thomas v. Mitchell-Bradford Chem. Co., 582 F. Supp. 1373, 1375 (E.D.N.Y. 1984);
Florence v. Krasucki, 533 F. Supp. 1047, 1050-52 (W.D.N.Y. 1982); Gabriel v. Kent Gen. Hosp., 95
F.R.D. 391, 393 (D. Del. 1982); Curry v. Johns-Manville, 93 F.R.D. 623, 625 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1982);
Anastacio v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 93 F.R.D. 560, 563 (D.NJ. 1982); American Banker's Ins. Co. of Fla.
v. Colorado Flying Academy, 93 F.R.D. 135, 137 (D. Colo. 1982); Kasko v. American Gage & Mach.
Co., 90 F.R.D. 162, 163 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Roesberg v.Johns-Manville, 89 F.R.D. 63, 66-67 (E.D. Pa.
1981).
117 See Lindley v. General Elec. Co., 780 F.2d 797, 799-801 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1186
(1986); Knauer v.Johns-Manville Corp., 638 F. Supp. 1369, 1376-79 (D. Md. 1986); Layton v. Blue
Giant Equip. Co., 105 F.R.D. 83, 86 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Santiago v. Becton Dickinson, 539 F. Supp.
1149, 1152-53 (D.P.R. 1982); Covel v. Safetech, Inc., 90 F.R.D. 427, 432-33 (D. Mass. 1981).
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15(c), three contain no discussion and no reference to Supreme Court
decisions under the Erie doctrine.1 18 Five others simply hold that Hanna
controls, with no reference either to Ragan or Walker. 119 There may be
several explanations for this phenomenon, such as that the lower courts
remain confused as to what the relevant authority is, or that the history
and authority supporting federal rule control prior to the Walker Court's
clarification and reaffirmation of Ragan is so deeply embedded that, in
the absence of clear Supreme Court guidance on Rule 15(c), the lower
courts will continue to give "knee-jerk" responses. The implications of
this latter view are most distressing. Given the crowded Supreme Court
docket, the notion that no understandable standard exists and that the
scope of each federal rule must be tested in the Supreme Court before
controversy is dispelled means prolonged chaos. But the future is less
bleak if we look more carefully at those Rule 15(c) opinions that actually
confront Walker. They suggest that an understanding and consensus may
be evolving concerning how to reconcile the scope of the Federal Rules
with state control over substantive matters, such as the statute of
limitations.
Of the seven opinions considering Walker, three favor the application of Federal Rule 15(c), 120 and four rule in favor of state law. 12 1 Distinctions between the underlying facts involved in these two sets of cases
may justify the different conclusions reached on the governing law issue.
Further, these opinions reveal that at least some federal courts are very
aware of the careful balancing of state and federal interests required
under Erie; they have not broadly construed either Hanna as automatically commanding federal rule dominance, or Walker as demanding deference to state law whenever the statute of limitations is implicated. No
"litmus paper" test has emerged.
Although each of the three cases upholding federal rule dominance
relied on Hanna, they went further. In each case the federal rule was
more liberal than the state provision on relation back. It was noted that
ruling in favor of federal law would not promote forum-shopping in violation of Erie since the question of amendments and relation back arises
after the suit is filed and thus is unlikely to enter into the choice of a
forum.1 2 2 Walker was distinguished on the ground that the Supreme
118 See Gabriel, 95 F.R.D. at 393; Curry, 93 F.R.D. at 625 n.3; Kasko, 90 F.R.D. at 163.
119 SeeJohansen, 810 F.2d at 1380; Santana, 686 F.2d at 740; Contemporary Mission, Inc., 665 F.
Supp. at 255; Thomas, 582 F. Supp. at 1375; Anastacio, 93 F.R.D. at 563.
120 See Florence v. Krasucki, 533 F. Supp. 1047 (W.D.N.Y. 1982); American Banker's Ins. Co. of
Fla. v. Colorado Flying Academy, Inc., 93 F.R.D. 135 (D. Colo. 1982); Roesberg v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 89 F.R.D. 63 (E.D. Pa. 1981). In each of these cases it was not clear that a different result
would have been commanded by state law; nonetheless, the court went on to complete a careful Erie
analysis. See Florence, 533 F. Supp. at 1053 n.3; American Banker's, 93 F.R.D. at 137; Roesberg, 89
F.R.D. at 66.
121 See Lindley v. General Elec. Co., 780 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1986); Knauer v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 638 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Md. 1986); Santiago v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 539 F. Supp. 1149 (D.
P.R. 1982); Covel v. Safetech, Inc., 90 F.R.D. 427 (D. Mass. 1981). A fifth decision honoring state
law exists, but the court there reached its conclusion based on an interpretation of Federal Rule
15(c) as incorporating state law, not on an analysis of the Erie doctrine. See Layton v. Blue Giant
Equip. Co., 105 F.R.D. 83, 86-87 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
122 See Florence, 533 F. Supp. at 1052-53; Roesberg, 89 F.R.D. at 67.
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Court there was concerned with a situation in which suit would be barred
in state court when originally filed in the federal forum so that allowing
the federal suit to go forward would violate the state statute of limitations.' 23 In contrast, Rule 15(c) deals only with amendments, and these
cases were .timely when they were filed. Finally, it was noted that unlike
the limited purposes of Rule 3, Rule 15 involves strong federal policies
of deciding cases on their merits. Further, its application would not invade any state limitations policies directed at assuring defendant notice
within the prescribed period, because the standards of Rule 15(c) also
are premised on adequate notice being accomplished. 124
These same observations also support the conclusion that Rule 15(c)
is valid under the Rules Enabling Act, given the minimal restrictions imposed by the substantive rights prohibition in that statute. 12 5 Although
the operation of the Rule might affect the litigants' rights, it fosters a
legitimate procedural purpose-that of avoiding decisions on technicalities rather than the merits by allowing simplified pleading, liberal amendments and the easyjoinder of claims and parties. 126 Rule 15(c) in no way
modifies the decisional rules by which the court will adjudicate the rights
27
involved.'
In contrast, an important element in the decisions supporting the
application of state law was the finding in each of those cases that the
relevant state rule was directly related to the limitations period or the
128 In
state's definition of the cause of action so that Walker controlled.
addition, however, each decision went on to find that deference to state
law satisfied the policies underlying Erie.
In two of the cases, the courts upheld the application of state rules
allowing the substitution of named defendants forJohn Does without requiring compliance with the standards of Rule 15(c). The Federal Rule
was construed as not dealing with 'the question of the permissible use of
John Does. Rather, Rule 15(c) was deemed applicable only when the limitations period had run. Therefore, the Federal Rule did not conflict with
the state law. 12 9 The third case involved a state provision allowing a
change of parties based solely on the fact that the additional claims arose
out of the same transaction as the original action. There, the court found
that adhering to state law was consistent with the general purpose of the
Federal Rule, which was to create a liberal climate for amendments.
Thus, unlike Hanna, it would not violate federal policy to apply state
law.' 3 0 In each of these three cases, the courts applied the careful rule
construction urged by the Hanna Court to find that no real conflict ex123

See Florence, 533 F. Supp. at 1051; American Bankers, 93 F.R.D. at 137; Roesberg, 89 F.R.D. at 67-

68.
124

See Florence, 533 F. Supp. at 1052.

125 See supra text accompanying notes 36-47.
126 See 6 C. WRiGTrr & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTCE AND
127

PROCEDURE § 1503, at 535 (1971).
See also 19 C. WRIGnTr, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 21, § 4509, at 148-60.

128 See Lindley v. General Elec. Co., 780 F.2d 797, 801 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1186
(1986); Knauer v.Johns-Manville Corp., 638 F. Supp. 1369, 1376 (D. Md. 1986); Santiago v. Becton
Dickinson & Co., 539 F. Supp. 1149, 1153 (D.P.R. 1982); Covel, 90 F.R.D. at 429.
129 See Lindley, 780 F.2d at 801; Santiago, 539 F. Supp. at 1153.
130 Covel v. Safetech, Inc., 90 F.R.D. 427, 431-32 (D. Mass. 1981).
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isted between federal and state law. In the fourth case, the court was not
able to avoid finding a conflict; state law was more restrictive than federal. However, the court noted that the state rule was strongly substantive in character, creating a condition precedent to suit, rather than
merely a statute of limitations. To allow the application of the Federal
Rule would produce the inequitable administration of the law that Hanna
and Erie both foreswore.13 1 Thus, all the courts carefully investigated the
purpose of both the state and federal rules and deferred to the state's
right to control substantive matters.
In sum, these post-1980 Rule 15(c) decisions are additional evidence
that the balance between federal and state power has not been shifted
automatically to federal rule dominance. Rather, the kind of careful inquiry into the proper scope of the federal and state rules suggested by
Hanna has ensured attention to state interests. 13 2 If these cases are any
indication, the lower courts, at least post-Walker, appear to appreciate
how to analyze this issue to assure that state interests are not overlooked.1 3 3 As Hanna itself exemplifies, this does not mean that the Federal Rules always must take a back seat. "Instead, all that is required is a
sensitive application of the Civil Rules that accommodates state concerns, and-in the rare cases of clear conflict-a limited decision that an
individual Rule cannot be applied in light of a particular conflict with a
specific state policy."' 3 4 These cases have accomplished this goal.
IV. Conclusion and Prognosis
There have been several recent attacks on Rule amendments and
current Rules that suggest growing tension in this marriage of state and
federal powers. 3 5 For example, the 1983 amendments to Rules 11 and
26 authorizing mandatory sanctions for attorney "misconduct" have
been challenged as creating new substantive rights for winning parties. 13 6 Consider also the furor over the proposed amendments to Rule
68 on offers of settlement, challenging their validity under the Rules Enabling Act on the ground that the proposal might be inconsistent with
Congressional desire to encourage civil rights litigation through attorney
131 See Knauer, 638 F. Supp. at 1379.
132 It has been suggested that Rule 15(c) may present a situation in which a federal rule should be
subordinated to important state substantive policies tied to the limitations period even when the
federal rule is on point. See Lewis, Jr., supra note 101, at 1554.
133 The approaches just described are appropriate from the limited standpoint this paper takesdo the courts appreciate the kind of careful policy analysis required since Hanna and the need to
construe the rules carefully to allow for deference to state law when appropriate. I have not attempted to investigate whether the precise rule or construction achieved by the courts appears correct. This latter inquiry might produce additional layers of controversy. See, e.g., Lewis, Jr., supra
note 101, at 1524-34. For example, in the case of the more restrictive Federal Rule which was held
not controlling, in part because the purposes underlying rule 15(c) were deemed satisfied by application of the state's approach, Schiavone now may suggest that a construction of the rule in light of its
purpose, rather than its plain meaning, may be inappropriate. See Bauer, supra note 100. It is not
clear that Schiavone should be read that broadly since it did not deal with the governing law problem.
Nonetheless, the potential for future confusion on that conclusion remains.
134 See 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 21, at 142.
135 See generally W. BROWN, supra note 17, at 86-93.
136 See Burbank, Sanctions in the ProposedAmendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Questions
About Power, 11 HoFsTRA L. REv. 997, 1007-09 (1983).
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fee awards to successful litigants.13 7 Even more broadly, the availability
of class actions under Federal Rule 23 has been seen as changing the
stakes of litigation to such a degree that its use has been challenged, on
the one hand, as altering substantive rights1 38 and, on the other, as denying rights because of the broad binding effect of the judgments
entered. 3 9
The political pressures in each of these settings ultimately may produce a legislative solution.' 40 That solution, if it comes, should not result in a wholesale stripping ofjudicial rulemaking authority.14 1 Rather,
Congress should respond more specifically to curtail the scope or impact
of Federal Rules in particular areas in which political interests demand
intervention.' 4 2 Consequently, it will remain for the courts to determine
the validity of most Rule challenges, deciding whether the line between
substance and procedure has been crossed.
137 See Burbank, Proposals to Amend Rule 68-Time to Abandon Ship, 19 MICH.J.L. REF. 425 (1986);
Silverstein & Rosenblatt, A Square Peg In a Round Hole: The Application of Rule 68 to Awards of Attorney's
Fees in Civil Rights Litigation, 16 CONN. L. REv. 949, 962-67 (1984); Note, The Conflict Between Rule 68
and the Civil Rights Attorneys'Fee Statute: Reinterpretingthe Rules EnablingAct, 98 HARv.L. REV. 828, 83846 (1985). But see Simon, Rule 68 at the Crossroads: The Relationship Between Offers ofJudgment and Statutory Attorne's Fees, 53 U. CIN. L. REv. 889, 904-05 (1984) ("Rule 68 functions as a purely procedural
device to assist the court in determining the extent of a prevailing plaintiff's right to attorney's fees
under section 1988.").
138 The availability of class relief has caused the courts to adapt new techniques of case management as well as to develop approaches to allow various issues to be proved collectively, rather than
individually. These changes, which may have the effect of allowing suits to go forward that before
would not have been brought, thus have expanded the potential for enforcement of certain laws.
For example, in the securities fraud area, in which reliance must be proved, the Supreme Court has
ruled that reliance may be inferred from the materiality of the misstatements or omissions, allowing
for easier class action certification because it no longer presents an individual issue. See Affiliated
Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-53 (1972). See generally 7B C. WRIGHr, A.
MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 1781, at 48-50 (1986). Such
changes provide ammunition for class action antagonists to charge that the substantive law is being
altered improperly merely to accommodate the smooth functioning of a federal rule. See Handler,
The Shift from Substantive to ProceduralInnovations in Antitrust Suits - The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust
Review, 71 COLuM. L. REv. 1, 5-10 (1971); Comment, The Impact of Class Actions on Rule 10b-5, 38 U.
Cm. L. REv. 337, 367-68 (1971). The validity of these criticisms is ably countered elsewhere. See
Hazard, The Effect of the Class Action Device Upon the Substantive Law, 58 F.R.D. 307 (1973). The point
here is simply to note that these tensions are ongoing and will continue, as they are part of the
nature of the rulemaking process. See, e.g., Fyr, On Classifying Class Suits: A Reply to Mr. Ross, 27 EMORY
LJ.267 (1978).
139 See generally 7B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 138, § 1789.
140 Problems in less politically controversial areas also have been identified to suggest the need
for congressional review of the rulemaking process. See Lewis, Jr., supra note 101, at 1565-69.
141 Most recent proposals to amend the Rules Enabling Act leave rulemaking to the judiciary, but
seek to expand the representativeness of the Advisory Committee and ensure broader and longer
opportunity for criticism. See, e.g., H.R. 1507, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). See generally W. BROWN,
supra note 17, at 79-86.
142 For example, after challenges to class actions under the Truth in Lending Act on the ground
that the use of the class device carried the statutory remedy to an extreme, CongTess amended the

statute to allow class relief, but placed a ceiling on damages. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B) (1982). See
generally 7B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 138, § 1804.
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The areas just mentioned present tough cases. However, given the
examination of how the courts have handled like questions in the equally
difficult area of statutes of limitations, it is reasonable to expect that they
will remain mindful ofJustice Brandeis' Erie constraints and will construe
the state and federal rules involved in such a way as to honor those policies. And we should not be surprised if, in the next fifty years, these
results do not come easily, but only after some confusion. For, as noted
143
by Professor Wright, "federalism is not a tidy concept."

143

C. WRIGHT, supra note 1I, at 364. See also id. at 387.

